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Abstract—The growing popularity and application of Web services have led to an increase in attention to the 
vulnerability of software based on these services. Vulnerability testing examines the trustworthiness, and 
reduces the security risks of software systems, however such testing of Web services has become increasing 
challenging due to the cross-platform and heterogeneous characteristics of their deployment. This paper 
proposes a worst-input mutation approach for testing Web service vulnerability based on SOAP (Simple Object 
Access Protocol) messages. Based on characteristics of the SOAP messages, the proposed approach uses the 
farthest neighbor concept to guide generation of the test suite. The test case generation algorithm is presented, 
and a prototype Web service vulnerability testing tool described. The tool was applied to the testing of Web 
services on the Internet, with experimental results indicating that the proposed approach, which found more 
vulnerability faults than other related approaches, is both practical and effective.  
Keywords-Web service vulnerability; SOAP message; Test case generation; Mutation operator; Security testing 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Due to the rapid development and wide application of the Internet, use of the service-oriented architecture 
(SOA) for distributed Web systems has been increasing. Although Web services are the typical form of SOA, 
and have been the focus of widespread attention and application, their quality and reliability problems 
represent significant obstacles to further development. Furthermore, due to some Web service characteristics, 
traditional software testing approaches are not easily applied. Some factors that contribute to the difficulty 
in application include: (1) different development and application environments (which increases the testing 
difficulty before the Web services are deployed); (2) the characteristics of Web service distribution, 
discovery, and dynamic bindings, as well as the uncertain and invisible processes; and (3) the need for a 
service interface for the Web service design and implementation when applying automatic testing methods 
and techniques. 
Although the testing of Web service robustness has already been examined [1-4], and a number of tools 
proposed, several difficulties and shortcomings remain, including: (1) a need for significant intervention in 
the testing process; (2) that only simple performance and access testing have been performed; and (3) that 
the approaches used in SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) message mutations are not optimal, with 
most studies to date being based on Web Services Definition Language (WSDL) specifications and 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) documents, and few using SOAP messages. A Web service, whose 
structure and source codes are not visible to the client, is located on the service provider's site, making 
research into its vulnerability challenging. Web service vulnerability refers to flaws in the service which 
threaten the security of the computer system, for example, memory leaks, buffer overflows and 
cross-boundary access (where memory variables access areas outside their defined scope). Some types of 
Web service vulnerability faults might not be effectively revealed by traditional approaches, including 
memory security faults, which are often triggered by illegal parameter values; and arithmetic security faults, 
which are often caused by parameter interaction such as dividing by zero, and out-of-range operand values.  
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To address the issue of testing Web service vulnerability, we propose an approach based on SOAP 
message mutation and the worst-input technique. The worst-input mutation method, which uses 
characteristics of SOAP messages, is presented in detail in this paper. The corresponding automatic test case 
generation algorithm, namely the test case generation based on the farthest neighbor (TCFN), is also 
discussed. The method involves partitioning the input domain into sub-domains according to the number 
and type of SOAP message parameters in the TCFN, and then selecting the candidate test case whose 
distance is farthest from all executed test cases and applying it to test the Web service. Finally, a prototype 
Web service vulnerability testing tool is implemented and applied to a number of real Web services, with 
experimental results showing that the proposed approaches are both effective and practical. 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: 
 We propose a set of mutation operators which can automatically mutate Web service SOAP messages 
based on security rules and message parameter types.  
 Using the farthest neighbor concept, we propose a worst-input mutation method to test Web service 
vulnerability, and present test case generation algorithms based on the number and type of SOAP 
message parameters. 
 We implement the proposed approach in a Web service vulnerability testing system (WSVTS) tool, 
which we further evaluate through comparison with other Web service testing approaches. The 
results show that in most cases the proposed approach can detect more faults. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: some related Web service testing work is discussed in 
Section II. The mutation operators and security rules are presented in Section III. The details of the proposed 
approach are presented in Section IV, with some experiments to evaluate it reported on in Section V. The 
future work and conclusion are given in Section VI.  
II.   RELATED WORK 
Currently, research into Web service vulnerability testing remains limited, with studies focusing mainly 
on functionality testing [2,5,6], reliability analysis [3], data perturbation [7-9], and Web service rule 
mutation [10-12]. 
Takase & Tajima [2] proposed an approach to the functional testing of Web services by first extracting the 
SOAP message using the WSDL converter, and then exchanging messages using the SOAP message 
binding framework. A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that it only bundled some of the input 
parameters to obtain the return value for a single message, rather than bundling multiple interdependent 
functions. If the combined services could be processed on the physical machine at the same time, then the 
process could be more efficient. Sun et al. [5,6] have proposed a metamorphic relations-based approach to 
testing Web services in the context of SOA without the need for oracles. An alternative approach based on 
fault injection was proposed by Wu et al. [3], but the working mode of SOAP documents could not be tested; 
multiple mistakes could not be injected at the network layer; and the fault injection messages could not be 
authenticated. An approach based on data communication perturbation was proposed by Almeida & Vergilio 
[7], where the perturbation operators were designed according to characteristics of the SOAP message. 
Experiments were conducted using their proposed mutation operators and SMAT-WS [7] tools, but it was 
found that the designed mutation operators were not sufficient for comprehensive testing. Fuzzy approaches 
to generating perturbation test cases have also been studied [8, 9], but to date, an appropriately feasible test 
case generation algorithm has still not yet been presented.  
Web service data value perturbation and rule mutation are the focus of the current paper. An approach to 
test-case generation based on data value perturbation was proposed by Offutt & Xu [10], where request 
messages were modified by mutation operations resulting from data value perturbation, RPC (Remote 
Procedure Call) communication perturbation, and data communication perturbation. However, only some 
special values such as maximum and minimum, and valid decimal, were considered in the mutation process. 
Their data value and communication perturbation approach [10] was modified by de Melo & Silveira [11], 
who also extended the mutations [12] introduced previously [1, 7], using an invalid test case value in the 
data value perturbation, and introducing two strategies (all and choice) and four mutation operators for RPC 
communication in the data communication perturbation. The test coverage for the RPC and document 
communication was also increased, but the overall mutation testing approach was not completely 
comprehensive, nor was a test case generation algorithm proposed.  
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We previously proposed a combinatorial mutation approach for testing the interactive faults of Web 
services [13]. The proposed approach defines the corresponding combinatorial strategies based on SOAP 
message mutation and combinatorial testing, allowing multiple mutants to be injected at one time to help 
uncover interactive faults. However, if the tested Web services have only one service method or one method 
parameter, then the combinatorial mutation approach cannot offer its full potential advantage. In order to test 
different kinds of Web services, we propose a worst-input mutation method based on the farthest neighbor 
concept, which, as a complementary approach to combinatorial mutation, can also enhance the effectiveness 
of Web service vulnerability detection.  
III.    MUTATION OPERATORS AND SECURITY RULES 
The appropriate design of mutation operators is critical for mutation testing based on SOAP messages, 
and for it to be successful, the object and the purpose of mutation should be explicitly clear. SOAP is a 
message protocol based on an XML document, which forms the basis of the mutation object. A formal 
description for the XML modeling of a SOAP message was given by Novak & Zamulin [14]. Offutt & Xu 
[10] extended the regular tree grammar (RTG) model to <E, N, D, P, A, ns>, but no specific parameter type 
information or classification were provided for the general characteristics of the XML document. Based on 
these models, we have improved and extended the RTG to an eRTG (extended regular tree grammar), which 
is a 6-tuple <E, N, DT, P, A, ns>, where: E is a finite set of elements; N is a finite set of non-terminals; DT is 
a finite set of data types defined as {int, string, bool, numerical, char, object}; P is a finite set of production 
rules; ns is the starting non-terminal; and A is a 2-tuple <n, type> with n as the number of parameters, and 
type as the parameter type, one of {rec, cir, cur}, where: rec is the rectangular input domain, cir is the 
circular input domain, and cur is the curved input domain. Given a set of all element instances N, a mutation 
operator is r = f(n1, n2, ..., ni), where f is a function, i1, each n1, n2, ..., ni∈N and has an arbitrary data type, 
and r outputs the mutated n1,...,ni with the same data type as the input n1,...,ni. 
Although a set of interference operators had been introduced previously [15, 16], the uncertainty and 
randomness of an initial object led to data redundancy and low efficiency after mutation. We have therefore 
designed a total of 15 mutation operators for SOAP parameter types combined with Web services features, 
as shown in Table I. 
Table I.  Mutation operators of web service vulnerability testing based on the SOAP message  
ID. Operator Brief description Cases / Examples 
01 SVB Set the Value of n to be Blank Change value n to ― ― 
02 SVN Set the Value of n to be Null Change value n to null 
03 IPO 
Insert Parameter Operator into 
the value assigned to a node n    
Insert absolute value symbol into the value assigned to node n 
04 DNS 
Delete a Node n and its child 
nodes from the SOAP message 
Delete root nodes and child nodes from the SOAP message 
05 FVS Format the Value of String ―%n %n……(256)‖,‖%s %s(1024)‖et al. 
06 IIV Integer Irregular Value 0,+/-(1,28-1,28,28+1,216,216+1,216-1,232,232+1,232-1,264, 264+1) 
07 FIV Float Irregular Value 
0, 1, -1, +/-(the max float point +/-1), +/-(the min float point 
+/-1),5E-324,1.7E+308,pi,e 
08 CIV Char Irregular Value 'A','Z',:Null,'a','z',' ', '','../','{','(','[',’\n’,’\0’,’\s’,’\d’ 
09 EOV 
Exchange the Order of Values 
assigned to nodes   
Exchange the order of the values assigned to n1, n2 
10 EON 
Exchange the  
Order of Nodes 
Exchange the order of n1, n2 
11 RSV Random String Value 
Escape character string‖\e\n\r\d\x\s‖, 
"\xff\xfe\x00\x01\x42\xb5\nnnn\h9cc..." 
12 LSV Long String Value 
Generate String(int n) such 
as:―AAA……(256)‖,‖AAA……(1024)‖,‖AAA…(15000)‖ 
13 UVF 
Url and the Value of File 
directory string 
"http://dddddddeeeeerrttttt"; "//sytem32//Notepad.exe", 
H:\ABC\killvirus.exe‖,‖D:\AA.exeexe‖\ 
14 SSI SQL String Injection ―a or 1=1‖, ―delete‖,―drop table users‖,―sql attempt5--‖ 
15 PFB Parameter Flip Bit Use ReverseBit() to flip the value assigned to a node n  
We defined a security rule for testing the vulnerability of Web services based on the proposed mutation 
operators as follows: the vulnerability of Web services is Vws= G(r), where r = f(n1, n2, ..., ni) is the 
mutation operator for the tested Web service; G(r) represents the vulnerability which is triggered by r; and 
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ni∈N are the Web service input parameters. When the tested Web services accept the input parameters, if 
any exceptions are triggered by the mutation operators, then the tested Web service is deemed to have some 
vulnerability flaws.  
It is usual to encapsulate data in a SOAP protocol format, and a SOAP message can be expressed as two 
parts: input parameters and security control rules. Based on the SOAP message input parameters, a 
worst-input mutation approach to SOAP message mutation testing is proposed and presented in the 
following section.  
IV.    WORST-INPUT MUTATION APPROACH 
With regular mutation [7], the mutant can be obtained through a small modification of the legitimate input. 
Taking the opposite perspective, we identify the farthest neighbor sequence from the legitimate input as the 
test data to generate test cases according to the SOAP message types. Effective test cases should have the 
greatest possible test coverage, typical representation for triggering faults, and low redundancy. The farthest 
neighbor idea is similar to the concept of adaptive random testing (ART) [17], which is based on various 
empirical observations showing that many program faults result in failures manifesting in contiguous areas 
of the input domain. Therefore suggesting that, if previously executed test cases have not revealed a failure, 
new test cases should be as far away from the already executed non-failure causing test cases as possible. 
Intuitively speaking, the farthest test cases have higher probability of detecting Web service security 
exceptions. Hence, we investigate some farthest algorithms to detect the security exceptions of Web services 
based on related ART algorithms and mutation. 
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Figure 1.  Flow chart of test case generation using the farthest neighbor algorithm 
The input domain is partitioned into sub-domains according to the number and type of SOAP message 
parameters. A corresponding test case generation algorithm is then selected, and test cases conforming to the 
requirements of each sub-domain are then randomly generated. The candidate test case whose distance is 
farthest away from all executed test cases is then selected and applied to test the Web service. Here we 
propose the TCFN algorithm (Algorithm 1) based on the presented eRTG model. The TCFN algorithm 
consists of six sub-algorithms: BRA (bit reversal); ResStr (string reversal); NFDT (next furthest distance 
test); CFTD (circle furthest distance test); a weighted Ming distance [18]; and a multidimensional variation 
inverse probability distribution. BRA or ResStr are used when the SOAP message has only one parameter; 
NFTD or CFTD are used when there are two; and the weighted Ming distance or inverse probability 
distribution algorithms are used when there are more than two parameters. As can be seen in the TCFN flow 
chart (Figure 1), the SOAP message is obtained by parsing the WSDL file of the Web services being tested. 
Using an XML analysis technique, the number and type of SOAP message parameters are extracted, based 
on which, different algorithms are then called to generate the test cases. 
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Algorithm 1: TCFN  
Input: the input domain D (Xmin, Ymin) (Xmax, Ymax) of the SOAP message parameter. 
Output: the set of test cases S={e1,e2,...,en}. 
(1)   if  (n==1)  then 
(2)       { if ( DT is numerical ) 
(3)          call BRA algorithm and related mutation operators; 
(4)        if (DT is string) then 
(5)          call ResStr algorithm and related mutation operators; 
(6)       } 
(7)   else 
(8)   if  (n==2)   then 
(9)      { divide the type of the input region according to parameter’s value; 
(10)        if  (type==rec)   then 
(11)            call the NFDT Algorithm; 
(12)         else 
(13)        if  (type==cir)   then 
(14)            call the CFDT Algorithm; 
(15)         else 
(16)        if  (type==cur)   then 
(17)            generate the max-value and the min-value of the same interval of the function according to  
input region distribution function and related mutation operators; 
(18)      } 
(19)  else 
(20)    if ( n >=3 )   then 
(21)       {   
(22)         call the inverse probability distribution or weighted Ming distance algorithms based on 
parameter features; 
(23)  } 
(24)  output the set of test cases S={e1,e2,...,en}. 
 
The input region is divided into subregions based on the number and type of message parameters, and 
then the appropriate algorithm is selected to generate test cases to test the Web service. The main 
sub-algorithms of the TCFN algorithm are as follows: 
(1) BRA Algorithm 
When the input parameter data type is Integer (int), the BRA algorithm and related mutation operators are 
used to generate the farthest test cases. The BRA algorithm flips all bits (from 0 to 1, and 1 to 0).  
(2) ResStr Algorithm 
The ResStr algorithm calculates the length of the string, reverses it, and uses the CIV mutation operator 
to increase or decrease the length of the reversed string. The Web service SOAP message can be mutated 
using the reversed string, after which the response information of the client is examined to determine the 
vulnerability. 
(3) NFDT Algorithm 
The NFDT algorithm is based on the adaptive random testing (ART) family of algorithms [19]. The test 
cases are divided into sets E (Executed) and C (Candidate), both of which are initially empty, but as testing 
progresses, E contains n executed test cases {el, e2, e3,...,en}, and C contains k random candidate test cases 
{cl, c2, c3,...,ck}. ART research suggests that changes in the Candidate set size have little impact on the 
speed of detecting the first failure when k≥10, so as with previous studies, we set k to 10 in this 
experiment [19]. At the start of testing, when E is empty, a test case e is generated randomly, executed, and 
then appended to E. The next test case, cj, can be selected from C by calculating the distance between each 
element of C, and the executed test case e, and then selecting that element (cj) which has the greatest 
distance. The NFDT algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.  
Algorithm 2: NFDT 
Input: the input domain D (Xmin,Ymin)(Xmax,Ymax) of the SOAP message parameter. 
Output: the set of test cases S={e1,e2,......,en} 
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(1)  input the region D of soap message {(Xmin, Ymin) (Xmax, Ymax)} 
(2)  set E={}, C={}.  
(3)  randomly generate the first test case e(x, y) by using related mutation strategies and operators, and     
divide D into T and L by e’ x-value.  
(4)  select T{(i, j),(s,t)}from D,(eT),DD-T; 
(5)  while (D != NULL) do 
(6)   {  if（T!=L） 
(7)            { if ( (x-i)≥(s-x)) 
(8)               the next test case is generated from T{(i, j),(x, t)}, then D=D∪{(i,j),(x,t)}; 
(9)             else 
(10)             the next test case is generated from L{(x, j),(s, t)},then D=D∪{(x,j),(s,t)}; 
(11)          } 
(12)      else 
(13)            select a field T or L randomly; 
(14)     select a big field Tˊ∈D, and randomly generate k test cases {c1,c2,....,ck} by using related    
mutation strategies and operators, C=C∪{c1,c2,...,ck}.  
(15)        sort the set of x value from small to large;           
(16)     find a test case e∈E, find Cj by using improved binary search method , whose x-axis is nearer to e 
(17)     calculate the distance 2 2d x y    ; 
(18)   calculate all the distances
ix between e and all the test cases behind Cj; 
(19)     for each Ci from Cj to Ck do 
(20)        {  if (d
ix ) 
(21)               d=dnew 
(22)           else 
(23)               stop calculating according to 2 2d x x y      ; 
(24)   } 
(25)     for each Ci from C1 to Cj do 
(26)       {  if (
id x  ) 
(27)               d=dnew 
(28)          else 
(29)              stop calculating according to 2 2d x x y      ; 
(30)       } 
(31)     search the max value d corresponding test case Cj as the next test case, Cj→e and E=E∪e, the     
two fields divided by Cj are joined in D; 
(32)      DD-T ; 
(33)  } 
(34)  return the set of test cases S={e1,e2,...,en}. 
The original binary search algorithm [20] is improved in step 13 to increase the search efficiency and to 
verify its effectiveness. Since the input region is finite set, as the number of test cases grows, so too does 
their density in the corresponding input region – the distance between a new test case and the nearest 
executed test case becomes much smaller. The candidate test cases can be considered when the distance 
between test cases (d ) is relatively large. A ratio parameter is then defined on the basis of the binary search 
algorithm as follows: an array [N] is an ordered integer array whose values range from small to large, and 
the sub-array from array [L] to array [H] is one sub-array of the ordered array, and the element array [mid] 
is the value which is the nearest to target value x. The mid is then selected. Hence, the ratio parameter 
formula is R=(x-array[L])/(array[H]-array[L]), then the formula 
(x-array[L])/(array[H]-array[L])=(mid-L)/(H-L) can be deduced,  and mid can be obtained using 
mid=L+R*(H-L). 
The difference between the NFDT algorithm and the typical FSCS (Fixed Size Candidates Set) ART 
algorithm is that the next test case is determined based on the position of test cases previously executed by 
the NFDT algorithm. The input domain is divided into two areas based on the previously executed test 
cases, thereby reducing the search space and number of distance calculations. The improved binary search 
algorithm can help to identify the candidate test case closest to previously executed test cases. According 
to the distance between the closest and executed test cases, a decision is made as to whether or not distance 
calculations will be made for all the candidate test cases, thus potentially reducing the total number of 
distance calculations performed, similar to the filtering technique used by Chan et al [21]. 
 7 
 
(4) CFDT Algorithm 
The CFDT algorithm uses the restricted adaptive random testing technique [22] to select the next test 
case, using an exclusion region radius. Generally speaking, the selected test cases have better detection 
capability for finding the security exceptions of Web services than general test cases. There are two reasons 
for this. Firstly, the selected test cases are always away from previously executed test cases that have been 
generated outside the exclusion region: more distant test cases can more easily find security exceptions 
than normal test cases [16]. Secondly, the selected test cases have been mutated based on mutation 
operators designed to detect special security exceptions. 
Two parameters, A and P, are defined to measure the SOAP input domain, when it is a circle or an 
ellipse. A and P represent the area and perimeter of an ellipse, =πA ab , (3( ) / 2 )P a b ab   , respectively 
[23,24] (a and b are the radii of the ellipse; when a = b, the ellipse is a circle). S is the set of test cases to be 
tested; C is the set of test cases randomly generated; and N is the number of test cases in S. The first test 
case is randomly generated, and the subsequent ones are generated using an iterative approach [22]. A 
parameter R = A / (2n )  is used to determine the size of the exclusion region. Each test case in S is set as 
the center of a region, with R as the radius of the circular exclusion region. The first generated test case not 
falling in an excluded region is then selected as the next test case. An adjustment parameter r is introduced 
to compensate for the effects of overlapping zones and portions of zones lying outside the input domain. R 
is set as / (2 )Ar n . The CFDT algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.  
Algorithm 3: CFDT  
Input: the circle center e1(x, y) and radius R of SOAP message input region 
Output: the set of test cases S= {e1,e2,...,en} 
(1)  set S={},C={}, n=0, r=1;   
(2)  randomly generate e1 by using related mutation strategies and operators and S=S∪e1; 
(3)  while ( R !=0 )  do 
(4)   {  find an exclusion circle (ei (i=1,2,3....), / (2 )R A n ), randomly generate k test cases {c1,   
c2, …., ck} and then {c1, c2, ..., ck}(ei, / (2 )R A n ) C=C∪{c1,c2,...,ck}; 
(5)      sort the k test cases according to x-value from small to large, calculate all distances di, and then  
find the test case ei whose distance is the largest and S=S∪ei, n=n+1; 
(6)      set r to adjust the exclusion region; 
(7)   } 
(8)  return the set of test cases S={e1, e2,..., en}. 
(5) Weighted Ming distance 
If the number of SOAP parameters (n) is three or more, then the inputs are regarded as the n-tuple data 
set (T), with each t=(x1, x2, …, xn), t∈T being a single input from T. When a test case (e) is generated 
randomly, a new coordinate system is defined based on it, with each previously executed point (test case) 
translated appropriately. Without loss of generality, the following explanation of this method is in 2D, but 
the method applies to higher dimensions: Lines L1 and L2 are perpendicular axes through the point e, 
dividing the area that includes all points within the neighborhood of e into four sub-areas M, N, S and O. 
The four sub-areas are marked as the neighborhood areas of point e. Lines L1 and L2 are also seen as the 
boundaries between the four areas, with the corners formed by the lines being called neighborhood angles. 
Across from each neighborhood angle a diagonal is formed, enclosing the neighborhood area. Any points 
in the neighborhood area should be filtered using related algorithms [18]. Based on the neighborhood areas 
and some rules [18][25], the weighted Ming distance (WD) between a point t and e is defined as 
n n
2 1/2
i i i i
i=1 i=1
WD=( |x -y | w ) / w  , where wi represents the corresponding weight for every input parameter to 
define the contribution of different parameter. The formula can measure the distance between different 
inputs. Given a current test case (e), the Furthest Neighbor (FN) formula is used to select the next test case, 
and is defined as ( ) { | : ( , ) ( , )}FN e r T t T WD e r WD t r     . The formula guarantees that the distance 
between the current and next test case is always greater than or equal to the distance between the next test 
case and any test case of T.  
(6) Inverse probability distribution 
If the n-tuple parameters are from a continuous input space and the inverse probability distribution 
function for the input space can be obtained, then it can be used to guide generation of some 
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unconventional test cases to detect security exceptions. Generally speaking, unconventional inputs can 
effectively trigger the security exceptions for Web services. The input distribution function is usually a 
probability density function, whose output ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 means that it is impossible to select 
inputs from the input domain, and 1 means that the inputs from the input domain are 100% available. The 
main steps needed to get the inverse probability distribution function are as follows [26]. 
Step 1: Describe the probability of each input (an ordered n-tuple) as a value in the n+1
th
 dimension; 
Step 2: Determine the hyper-plane which is defined by setting the n+1 dimension value to a constant, 
1/K, where K is the cardinality of the input space;  
Step 3: Reflect the input distribution through this hyper plane; 
Step 4: If any of the resulting values in the n+1
th
 dimension are negative, translate the graph by a vector 
of magnitude C, so that all the values in the n+1 dimension are non-negative; 
Step 5: Normalize the resulting graph in n+1 space, dividing each value by the total volume. At the end 
of this step, the value in n+1 space associated with each n-tuple is the probability of selection in the  
inverse probability distribution function. 
The SOAP message is obtained by parsing the WSDL file of the Web services being tested, and is then 
transformed into a DOM tree. Based on the number and type of SOAP parameters, the appropriate TCFN 
algorithm is called to generate test cases. The complexity of the TCFN algorithm is mainly determined by 
the BRA algorithm, ResStr, NFDT, CFDT, weighted Ming distance and inverse probability distribution 
algorithms. In the BRA algorithm, flipping all bits (from 0 to 1, and 1 to 0) is time consuming. If the bit 
length of the integer is n, then the complexity of BRA algorithm is O(n). In the ResStr algorithm, 
traversing the entire string is time consuming. If the length of the string is n, then the complexity of ResStr 
algorithm is O(n). In the NFDT algorithm, a set of test case candidates randomly generated in the input 
domain is maintained. Each time a new test case is required, the candidate test case that is farthest from all 
previously executed test cases is selected. The runtime of the NFDT algorithm when generating n test cases 
is in the order of O(n2). The main time cost of the CFDT algorithm is the large number of distance 
calculations which are performed when new test cases are selected. The runtime of the CFDT algorithm 
when generating n test cases is in the order of O(n2·logn). The time complexity of both weighted Ming 
distance algorithm and inverse probability distribution algorithm is respectively O(n2). The total time 
complexity of the TCFN algorithm is therefore O(n)+O(n)+O(n2)+O(n2)+O(n2)+O(n2·logn) = O(n2·logn). 
V.   EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS 
A. Experimental implementation 
To investigate and evaluate the proposed TCFN algorithm, a Web service vulnerability testing system 
(WSVTS) was implemented. The WSVTS framework is shown in Figure 2. WSVTS obtains the interface 
information by parsing the uniform resource locator (URL) of the Web service, and gets the SOAP 
message by parsing the WSDL document.  
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Figure 2.  The WSVTS framework 
WSVTS was implemented in Visual C# on the Microsoft.NET platform, and contains four main function 
modules: (a) the SOAP message generator; (b) the SOAP message mutation generator; (c) the test case 
generator; and (d) the Web service vulnerability analyzer. The details of these major modules are presented 
in the following.  
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1) SOAP message generator 
The input to the SOAP message generator is a WSDL file of the Web service being tested, and consists 
of the response message data type, the transmission protocol and the Web service address information. The 
output is a Web service SOAP message. 
2)  SOAP message mutation generator 
Based on mutation operators designed for different fault types, the mutation module mutates the SOAP 
message parameter type and value. The parameter type and number are obtained from the SOAP message 
generator, and the test cases are obtained from the test case generator.  
3) Test case generator  
The test case generator provides a convenient interface for the tester to input test cases, and can also use 
different algorithms based on the SOAP message parameter number, as analyzed by the SOAP message 
generator. 
4)  Vulnerability analyzer 
The vulnerability analyzer generates a vulnerability report after testing the Web services. It analyzes the 
Web service vulnerability based on the security specifications, and reports the number of security 
exceptions and faults found. 
As can be seen in the WSVTS flow chart (Figure 3), the SOAP message is obtained by parsing the 
WSDL file of the Web services being tested. Then, using an XML analysis technique, the number and type 
of SOAP message parameters are extracted, based on which, the appropriate TCFN algorithm is called to 
generate test cases. The Web services are tested based on the testing controller and client driver, using the 
generated test cases. Finally, the vulnerability testing report is obtained based on observations of the 
response messages received from the client of the Web services being tested. 
Vulnerability test report
Analyze SOAP 
message 
Generate test 
cases
Execute test 
cases
 Web Services
Analyze the number 
of SOAP parameters
Parse WSDL file
WSVTS 
Model
TCFN
 
Figure 3.  Flow chart of the Web service vulnerability testing system  
In the experiments, in addition to several open Web services, some specifically written services were 
also analyzed. The list of tested Web services is shown in Table II.  
During the experimental process, the function of the IPO mutation operator was merged with that of 
either the IIV or PFB mutation operator to generate test cases, according to the specific circumstances and 
SOAP message types. Different mutation operators may find the same error for the same Web service, in 
which case the error was counted only once. Similarly, the same fault found by different test cases 
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generated by the same perturbation operator was also only counted once. The operator efficiency (OE) 
defines the efficiency of an operator in terms of finding faults, and is calculated as OE=EF/TC, where EF 
is the number of faults found and TC is the total number of test cases generated by the operators. The 
efficiency of the mutation operators is shown in Figure 4. Different mutation operators have different 
efficiency, with the FVS operator having the highest (36.52%). 
B. Experimental results and analysis 
Web service vulnerabilities were found by the proposed approaches. Although the proposed mutation 
operators are applicable to related approaches, the test case generation rules may differ. Also, the 
continuous types of test case generation are more complex than the discrete types, and test cases for the 
continuous types can be adapted to the discrete types but not vice versa. We next compare our proposed 
approach with two others, SOAPUI [27] and SMAT-WS [7]. 
1)  Comparison of WSVTS and SOAPUI  
A total of 20 kinds of specially designed Web services were investigated using the two approaches based 
on the SOAP message parameter type. The SOAPUI [27] is an open source Web service testing tool, and 
WSVTS is a testing tool based on the approach proposed in this paper. Table III shows the experimental 
results for the open source tool SOAPUI, in which the test cases are manually entered according to the 
SOAP message parameter type; and Table IV shows the results for WSVTS. Based on these results, the 
overall efficiency (OE) of the mutation operators generated by the two approaches are calculated to be 
approximately 21.1% and 23.7%, respectively, confirming the feasibility of our proposed approach, and the 
validity of the test cases generated.  
Table II. The tested Web services  
No. Service Name 
The number of  
service methods  
The number of  
method 
parameters 
Description 
WS1 Stock 8 23 Searching stock information 
WS2 Weatherforecast 7 19 Weather forecast service 
WS3 E-Banking 9 25 Online banking service 
WS4 Bookfinding 6 15 Searching book information 
WS5 Domainfinding 5 13 Searching domain and IP address 
WS6 Petinformation 7 16 Searching Pet information 
WS7 Traintime 7 14 Searching train timetable  
WS8 Planetime 5 12 Searching aircraft flight information 
WS9 QQcheckonline 7 13 Searching QQ online information 
WS10 Queryresults 9 22 Searching student achievement information 
WS11 Producedorder 8 16 Searching production order information 
WS12 Calculator 7 15 Arithmetic calculating service  
WS13 Maxdivisor 5 
10 Finding the greatest common divisor of two 
numbers 
WS14 Mod 4 8 Finding the remainder of two numbers 
WS15 Reversestring 8 14 Reversing the string 
WS16 Stringcopy 6 12 Copying the string 
WS17 Stringlength 4 8 Obtaining the length of string 
WS18 Login 5 8 User login 
WS19 Vote 5 16 Getting the result of the vote 
WS20 Echoinformation 6 13 Echoing personal information 
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Figure 4.  Efficiency of the mutation operators 
 
Table III. Test results of the SOAPUI tool 
Mutation 
operators  
DNS SVN EON EOV SVB SSI LSV IIV FVS CIV RSV FIV UVF PFB Total OE 
Number of test 
cases generated 
42 124 113 97 130 40 211 151 115 197 98 102 41 118 1579 21.1% 
Faults found 8 19 11 9 38 2 28 45 42 36 31 28 7 30 334  
Table IV. Test results of WSVTS tool 
Mutation 
operators 
DNS SVN EON EOV SVB SSI LSV IIV FVS CIV RSV FIV UVF PFB Total OE 
Number of test 
cases generated 
42 118 113 97 123 33 164 126 115 150 99 88 35 118 1421 23.7% 
Faults found 10 19 11 11 38 2 28 45 42 38 31 28 11 23 337  
Figure 5 gives a comparison of the efficiency of the two approaches, showing that for most operators, 
the number of faults found by the WSVTS approach is higher than that found by the SOAPUI tool 
(exceptions being the EON, FVS, RSV, and PFB operators). The UVF operator appears particularly 
efficient. The faults found consist of some common vulnerability faults such as memory leak, buffer 
overflow, cross-boundary access, and arithmetic security faults including dividing by zero and out-of-range 
operand values. Thus, the designed operators and our approach are confirmed to be very effective.  
 
Figure 5. Comparison of the WSVTS and SOAPUI efficiencies 
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2)  Comparison of SMAT-WS, WSVTS, and SOAPUI 
Research on SOAP message mutation testing is still not common. The experimental results of SOAP 
message perturbation reported by Almeida & Vergilio [7] is reproduced here in Table V. Their proposed 
mutation operators are different from ours because of the different Web services, therefore we compare the 
approaches based on the overall efficiency of the mutation operators: the overall effectiveness of the test 
cases generated by the SMAT-WS testing tool is 15.7%. A comparison of all three methods is shown in 
Figure 6. 
Table V. SMAT-WS test results [7]  
Mutation operators I N BE IN VI S B U ML Total OE 
Number of test cases 
generated 
54 54 363 43 45 54 162 54 108 937 15.7% 
Faults found 16 21 24 2 8 19 27 16 15 148  
Mutation Operators: Incomplete (I), Null (N), Boundary Extension (BE), Inversion (IN), Value Inversion (VI), Space(S), 
Unauthorized (U), Mod_Len(ML), Boundary(B) 
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Figure 6.  Comparison of the SMAT-WS, SOAPUI, and WSVTS tools 
The experimental results in Figure 6 show that SMAT-WS finds more faults at the earlier stage of testing, 
but that the rate of faults found by WSVTS increases fastest, supporting the validity of this approach. The 
fault-finding abilities of the SMAT-WS and SOAPUI approaches are similar within a certain range. 
Although the three approaches (SMAT-WS, SOAPUI and WSVTS) are all based on SOAP message 
mutation, the corresponding proposed mutation operators are different because the Web services tested 
with SMAT-WS are different from those tested by SOAPUI and WSVTS. In general, the number of test 
cases generated is different because of the different mutation operators applied to different situations as 
well as the number of faults.  
Compared with the other methods, the advantages of the WSVTS tool include that the mutation 
operators expand according to the characteristics of the SOAP message in the experiment – in other words, 
the testing is more comprehensive; and the algorithm is automatically called to generate test cases 
according to the number of parameters and the SOAP message type. The targeted faults consist of buffer 
overflow faults, cross-boundary access faults and arithmetic security faults. 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
Research on Web service vulnerability testing remains limited, partly due to their cross-platform and 
differing characteristics. In this paper we have presented mutation operators designed for SOAP messages, 
and a mutation testing algorithm for the automated generation of test cases.  
By designing appropriate SOAP message mutation operators, the security of the Web services can be 
tested from the client side, and vulnerability faults can be identified from the user perspective. In most cases, 
compared with the classic farthest neighbor algorithm, the proposed TCFN algorithm reduces the number of 
distance calculations. Compared with the pure random testing, the proposed TCFN algorithm can detect 
more faults with fewer test cases. Because specifically tailored test cases can be generated, the efficiency 
and quality of test case generation can be improved. Furthermore, the test cases can also be generated 
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automatically, using legal and illegal input parameters and mutation operators. The effectiveness of the 
proposed approach has been shown to be higher than that of other available approaches. The efficiency of 
the proposed mutation operators is higher than other approaches such as SMAT-WS. In addition, the 
approach can detect more vulnerability faults than other approaches with the same test cases. 
In the future, we would like to continue research in the following areas: firstly, we will do more 
experiments to verify the reliability of the proposed approaches. Secondly, we will research how to further 
reduce the redundant test cases after mutating. Thirdly, the automatic process of test case generation and 
mutation also need to be further improved to enhance the testing efficiency. 
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